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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
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This note is FYI.

I thought you might find some interest in reading an article entitled, "Strategic Defenses Now". A copy is attached.

If ACIS may do more to help you, please call.

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# STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

GLOBAL AFFAIRS SUMMER 1986 Pg.17

*Angelo Codevilla*

## STRATEGIC DEFENSES NOW

The Soviet Union now possesses enough intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with the necessary combination of reliability, accuracy, and warhead yields to eliminate the vast majority of our own forces in a preemptive attack. By doing so, the Soviet Union could well prevent a militarily meaningful retaliation by the United States. Moreover, this could be accomplished using only a fraction of Soviet assets, with the remainder held in reserve as a powerful incentive to us and the rest of the world not to retaliate. This is not a doomsday scenario. It is inherent in the actual capability of existing Soviet missile forces. These forces, unlike ours, were not built to deter by threatening senseless damage. Rather, they were built to be used against our military forces. They were not built to destroy us, but to defeat us.

This is not a passing problem. It has been coming for a long time, and has shown no signs whatever of going away. On the contrary. When Ronald Reagan was first sworn in as president, the Soviets held almost a four-to-one advantage in these "counterforce" missiles. Since that time, the Soviets have added "counterforce" missile warheads to their arsenal at the rate of almost twenty a month, every month, year in and year out since 1981. During the same time—and despite intense efforts on the part of the administration—the United States has not added *one* hard-target weapon. Today's ratio, which is also an important sign of instability, stands at almost six-to-one. According to recently declassified CIA estimates, it will continue to worsen indefinitely. As long ago as the mid-1960s, American strategists foresaw the possibility that we might fall into this predicament, and they worked hard to avoid it. Unfortunately, they chose an approach that proved to be wrong: arms control. Through agreements,

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the Soviet Union, like ourselves, was to be limited to missiles insufficient in number and in quality to threaten the other side's retaliatory forces. In order to obtain this deal, the SALT I interim agreement, we also signed the ABM Treaty, by which we pledged to keep ourselves vulnerable to Soviet missiles indefinitely. However, as Secretary of State George Shultz has recently pointed out, these agreements are susceptible to different interpretations. Thus, while we did not develop the capability to threaten their missile forces, they developed the capability to threaten ours.

Whether through violation, circumvention, or legitimate interpretation of the treaties, the Soviets went right on building eight thousand more nuclear weapons after we agreed to forgo strategic defenses. They are expected to add more than double that number by 1996. Yet even as the counterforce capability of Soviet ballistic missiles exploded beyond our highest estimates, traditional thought fervently clings to the cherished belief in the hope SALT III would do what SALT I, SALT II, and our unilateral restraint did not.

Traditional reasoning would lead us to believe that if Soviet ICBMs threaten silo-based U.S. ICBMs, we should negotiate an agreement to limit that threat. If Soviet anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) threaten U.S. satellites, we should seek to ban all space weapons, even if Soviet satellites threaten U.S. military forces.

If traditional U.S. strategic thought is to be believed, U.S. and allied vulnerability to Soviet nuclear weapons is good; invulnerability, bad. Accordingly, some U.S. offense is said to be good, but not if it threatens Soviet nuclear forces or their military power, and any active U.S. defense against those forces is bad. Our defense supposedly fuels their offense. If we say no to defense they will say no to offense, and vice versa. Or so the logic goes. The emergence of a credible Soviet counterforce threat in the context of arms control discredits fundamental premises of traditional thinking and underscores its total failure.

Today, despite its apparent clear failing, traditional thought leads inescapably to two alternative means of response to the current situation: negotiation of arms control agreements that limit counterforce threats below a threshold of counterforce strike capability and, barring that, development of a counter-counterforce capability in response. These alternatives are wholly inadequate when matched against the new strategic reality. To put it starkly: There is no reason why the Soviet Union should treat any future arms control agreement with any more respect than it treats current agreements. Under current agreements, the Soviets have achieved precisely the objectives that we had sought to prevent by entering into the agreements in the first place. Yet, we have done nothing to undo the damage this has caused us. Why should the Soviets suppose we would behave differently while they frustrated the fundamental purpose of the *next* arms control agreement? Moreover, our problem is not just to keep our predicament from getting worse; it is to find a way out. We simply cannot accept long-term vulnerability.

The relentless Soviet military buildup has given the Soviet leaders the wherewithal to seriously consider some frighteningly realistic military moves against American forces abroad, against our allies, and against the United States itself.

The Soviets' ability to deliver large numbers of large, accurate counterforce nuclear weapons anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere, without hindrance, is the foundation of their military power. Under its cover the Soviets guard their East European captives, rape Afghanistan, oppress Angola, and cover Vietnam's occupation of Southeast Asia. Someday the Soviet Union might even try to take a piece of Europe or the Persian Gulf. It may choose to drive U.S. ships from critical shipping lanes and chokepoints, or even to extend protection to its Cuban friends as they try to press Central America and Mexico into the ranks of a widening anti-American coalition. In any or all these actions, the Soviet armed forces could choose to use nuclear weapons. Would we react in kind, knowing that the Soviets are behind today's terrible actions? And behind the specter of worse actions in the future lies the reality of what the Soviets could do if the United States objected too forcefully—that is, use those ICBMs to disarm American strategic forces in substantial part.

Unless we remove a disarming strike from the Soviet Union's menu of realistic options, nothing else we do in the military field is likely to have much meaning.

Since the Soviets have the missiles for such a strike, and will not give them up, we have no choice but to prepare to make sure that, if they ever launch them, we will be able to destroy them in flight.

Fortunately, however, any means we acquire that would first complicate, and then remove this Soviet option would also serve the vital function of protecting U.S. forces and allies abroad. Of

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course, such anti-missile means would also serve to ward off the few—if any—nuclear weapons that a determined Soviet attacker might direct to the vicinity of U.S. and allied centers of population.

This is terribly important in and of itself. Protecting the civilian population from the collateral effects of military clashes is perhaps the first duty of any government. No government in history has ever been able to guarantee the complete safety of all its population under all circumstances. But all legitimate governments are obliged to try to fulfill this function to the best of their ability. During the sixties and seventies, the U.S. government took an historically unprecedented approach to this responsibility. We gave up trying to protect ourselves by military means, trusting our safety to arms control. Over the past twenty years, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have tried sincerely to craft agreements with the Soviet Union that would have made Soviet strategic forces unable to carry out militarily meaningful attacks. These agreements were also meant to ensure the mutual vulnerability of the Soviet and American peoples. But honesty compels us to admit that as the arms control process has continued, the Soviet Union's ability to carry out such an attack has continued to grow. American military forces are now at great risk and the American people are more vulnerable than ever to the collateral effects of nuclear attack.

The Soviet military and the Soviet people have become less vulnerable. No one can seriously argue that the Soviets will willingly abandon the capability to disarm and blackmail the United States. They have worked hard to achieve this position, despite arms control agreements, and can be expected to continue perfecting it, regardless of what we, or they, say. No responsible person today can propose any means by which we might enforce future agreements upon the Soviets any more effectively than we are enforcing those in effect today. Indeed, we can expect that as our relative vulnerability continues to grow, the Soviets will be more tempted to make use of it. How can we get out of this situation? We can build weapons to protect ourselves against their prized, expensive missiles. We should do so. We have no time to waste.

There is much more to restoring our strategic position than defending against Soviet missiles. But let us begin by considering the indispensable necessity of strategic defenses.

**Strategic Defense**

Those of us who have turned to strategic defenses have done so not just because it is morally preferable to save lives than to avenge them. We have done so for the practical reason that there is no genuine alternative. If we are not to concede to the Soviet Union the permanent privilege of intimidating us and our allies any time it chooses, and of backing its predatory behavior with the ever-present possibility of disarming strikes, we have to build weapons that will make such strikes unreasonable and such blackmail not credible. We chose strategic defense because we believe that the best way to avoid war is to make sure that our adversary cannot gain a military advantage by starting one.

But are defensive means available? Is it in fact possible to defend our forces, our allies, and ourselves against Soviet ballistic missiles? The answer is complex. Yes, a variety of very good technologies can be built into anti-missile tools today. However, far other, presumably more effective technologies will not be available for five, ten, or twenty years—perhaps never. We believe that, using what is available today, we can defend against what we have to fear most: the Soviet Union's cold, calculating, rational, military use of its missile force.

We recognize that today's technology, and probably the next century's as well, would not suffice to provide absolute assurance that the Soviet Union, in a militarily meaningless and counterproductive act, might not concentrate all its forces to blow up an American city. No defensive scheme in history was ever able to ensure against an attacker sacrificing his forces, whether mounted knights, infantry, or nuclear missiles, to destroy a militarily meaningless target. We doubt that any ever will. To illustrate this point, we should realize that even if a perfect defense were devised against all missiles, ballistic or cruise, as well as all aircraft, an attacker bent on causing militarily meaningless damage could send a few nuclear weapons or devices dispensing plague germs through commercial channels. But there is no reason to regard this fact as particularly important, or even as terribly new. Thousands of years ago, cities with impregnable walls were subject to having their wells poisoned or outlying settlements razed. Yet, even mad rulers usually shy away from doing such things because they stand to gain nothing, except retribution from powerful opponents whose fighting capacity they have not harmed but

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electronics of the mid-1980s to rebuild the Nike-X BMD system that we scrapped in the 1970s. With modern computers, our big peripheral radars (six were projected, but we built only one, at Grand Forks, North Dakota) would discriminate and manage tens of thousands of possible targets. Just two radars like these could cover Europe. These radars could coordinate hundreds of long-range Spartan interceptors (fitted with modern guidance and non-nuclear warheads) and placed under the corridors that warheads coming from the USSR would have to traverse. In these corridors we could also emplace some hundreds of the deep-space, ground-based interceptors demonstrated in June 1984 by the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). Such means would assure a Soviet planner that perhaps one thousand of his warheads would never make it into the atmosphere, *regardless of where they were aimed*. The Soviet planner could have no knowledge which warheads, headed for which targets, would not make it.

This would be terribly disruptive of aggressive plans. For example, a Soviet planner, taking into account that a "must" target might be defended by two units of an American SA-12, might allocate twenty-five warheads to that target, and feel confident that it would be destroyed. Suppose that in addition to the SA-12 point defense we also had a corridor defense. Not knowing how many of the twenty-five warheads he had allocated to his "must" target would be among those intercepted by our Spartans and HOEs, the Soviet planner might concentrate his fire further, perhaps devoting one hundred warheads to one target. Alternatively, he might inform his political masters that in order to be really sure of getting through unpredictable defenses, he has to narrow the target list excessively, and that therefore the attack really might not be worthwhile.

This kind of effect would be most likely to discourage the relatively small, high-payoff attacks that the Soviets might otherwise find most attractive in the decade before us. If the Soviets were counting on a few "surgical" nuclear strikes to clear their tanks' path in Europe, or to help overwhelm an American expeditionary force in the Persian Gulf, the prospect of defense by relatively few corridor-type defenses, backed by mobile ABMs, would instantly transform the choice between a strike of a size disproportionate to the military objective or no strike at all.



Again, we know how defenses reduce the significance of nuclear strikes in the planner's mind because the Soviets are actually completing six high-performance peripheral radars, based on modern data processing (plus a seventh even more capable one) that could do nationwide battle-management. They have open production lines for the Flat-Twin missile-guidance radar, a Spartan-type interceptor, and a spring-type interceptor. These are all inherently movable. Our planners know they can ignore the possibility of their presence in critical places at critical times only at the risk of having their strike much reduced in meaning. U.S. planners know that when the Soviet radar network is completed, as it will be in a few years, and when the Soviet production lines have run awhile, our current retaliatory arrangements—and indeed our current nuclear arsenal—simply will not be worth as much. Why, then, do we not act *now* to make the Soviet arsenal less fit for aggression?

Here, too, technical feasibility is not a real question. Of course we can build a modern nationwide battle management system as well as the Soviets are, perhaps better. We know we can, because we started building the Nike-X almost twenty years ago. Today the tools at hand for building it are incomparably better. If the administration understood the necessity of doing what we can with what is at hand, the Soviets would not be the only ones building such a system.

Yet we could do even more. Imagine how much more we could reduce the Soviets' ability to do us harm if we were to place in orbit thousands of anti-missile rockets armed only with very accurate guidance systems. Such guidance systems have long served on the Phoenix and Maverick air-to-air missiles, or the Air Force's "tomato can" anti-satellite homing vehicle. Such systems could guide the rockets to direct impact on missile boosters rising from Soviet silos or submarines. Let us suppose that only ten bundles of twenty rockets each, out of ten times that many, were in the right place at the right time. If they were, two hundred Soviet missiles, carrying as many as two thousand warheads, would never get beyond the Arctic.

How could a Soviet planner deal with this prospect? In order to regain the mathematical certainty that target "X" would be destroyed that he had before Americans built SA-12s capable of point defense, rebuilt the Nike-X system, capable of focusing

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ground-based defenses, and a rudimentary boost-phase defense, he would have to devote perhaps two hundred warheads where previously he had devoted one.

This is not news to American intelligence analysts who understand the technology of precision guidance in space, who have followed the Soviets' commitment to using space, and who have followed the Soviets' preparations for using space-based rockets for defensive purposes. Some analysts believe that the Soviets will limit the use of such weapons to the protection of their satellites. But all know that the Soviets do not have to so limit themselves.

Why, then, do we limit ourselves in this field to tautological experiments with guidance systems that we already know are more than adequate? There is no good reason for U.S. policy to proceed as if significant questions exist about the technical feasibility of space-based, anti-missile rockets. In point of fact, with this kind of weapon, the problem lies outside the realm of technology and squarely in that of management and economics. Long-range intercepts of boosters with rockets require very high speeds. Only relatively big rockets can achieve these speeds. But big rockets are expensive to place in orbit.

At NASA's current prices per-pound-in-orbit, such a weapons system would be prohibitively expensive for us. But technology does not drive NASA's prices. These are determined largely by the fact that fully fourteen thousand people are now used in the shuttle-launch system. In the face of such inefficiency, any and all efforts to shrink the size of the "smart rocks" are destined not to get very far. The Soviets, for their part, have developed huge "dumb" space launchers that may well be efficient enough to launch the massive amounts of rocket fuel needed to make "smart rocks" for anti-missile work. But we have not begun to build the cheap, unsophisticated space launchers needed to make use of them. Nothing stands in the way of doing so except a self-imposed obfuscation of objectives. Yet space-based rockets do not exhaust our possibilities for self-defense.

Suppose that the Defense Department had followed the directive of the U.S. Senate's defense authorization bills passed in 1981 and 1982, and had built a space-based laser weapon as quickly as possible. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency wrote to the Congress in 1980 that an accelerated program would have yielded a weapon in 1986. In 1981 the Pentagon reported that the United States could have a fleet of ten-megawatt laser weapons with ten-meter mirrors in orbit in the early 1990s—an option it recommended against, but not because anyone judged that such weapons could not destroy ballistic missile boosters.

Indeed, all agree that a ten-megawatt hydrogen fluoride laser will project as much radiant energy as is found at the surface of the sun (7000J/cm2) at 1,000 kilometers, and almost 800J/cm2 at 3,000 kilometers. That is more than enough to destroy in a second or less any missile booster ever designed. The objection to current laser weapons has been that in the indefinite future they would have difficulty dealing with a hypothetical race of supermissiles, resistant to 100,000J/cm2. But of course no one has ever designed, much less built such supermissiles. They exist only on paper, and only for the purpose of constraining the American laser weapons that the Senate directed be built. Of course, the prospect of these hypothetical supermissiles has not slowed the Soviet space laser program. The first copy of the Soviet space laser—about whose capabilities we will know next to nothing—will be in orbit in this decade.

But, continuing, suppose the United States had followed the Senate rather than the bureaucracy, and by 1990 the United States had twenty-four laser stations distributed in three polar rings of eight each. Eight of these twenty-four at any given time would be in range of missiles rising from Soviet fields. These eight together could kill a minimum of two missiles per second. How would they affect the prospects for peace? How would they affect the amount of damage that the Soviets could do to the United States?

Clearly, given the existence of these American lasers, a militarily rational Soviet strike would be out of the question. To wholly stanch small strikes, such as the Soviets might launch to clear the way in Europe, or to eliminate a naval force, the complex of laser stations would have to operate only at a small fraction of its capacity. Against a big strike aimed at disarming the United States two missile-kills per second would be devastating. Such a strike might involve as many as five hundred MIRVed ICBMs, fired over a 250-second span. About five hundred seconds would elapse between ignition of the first and burnout of the last missile in the attack. The defensive complex would be likely to destroy all of them! To get a substantive number of missiles through the

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system, the Soviets would have to salvo their ICBM forces—a militarily insane act, because it could not result in coordinated, disarming explosions on targets half a world away.

Moreover, if in addition to the lasers the United States also had built its version of the SA-12, the Nike-X, and the space-based rocket system, no one could tell how few warheads would get through. The Soviets could have no mathematical confidence that any of the military targets they were really after could be destroyed—never mind all of them. We, on the other hand, could have high confidence that important elements of our force would survive. More important, we could catch any "stay rounds" that threatened our population. The overall number of warheads arriving in the United States would be both low and militarily unattractive to the attacker.

None of this is to say we should not fear the prospect of even a dozen nuclear bombs going off at random in our country; quite the contrary. But by doing what we can we would have transformed our present predicament, in which the Soviets' rational use of nuclear weapons in the world is backed by the possibility of a disarming strike on the United States, into a situation in which only a madman would attack us, and do relatively little harm if he did. By doing what is possible we would have accomplished more than a little to protect our peace and our lives.

Of the anti-missile weapons buildable today, we Americans are building none while the Soviets are building all. This is ominous because we, not they, need protection against a first strike.

But they who have built a first-strike missile force are now building first-generation anti-missile weapons that, even in small numbers, would serve the Soviet Union well by absorbing most, if not all, of an American retaliatory strike. If, as we now envisage, American strategic forces were decimated on the ground by Soviet counterforce strikes, the Soviet defenses that are now being built would render irrational any American retaliation. It would be nice if the United States' rhetorical turn to strategic defense were an "initiative." In fact, the Soviets now hold the initiative in strategic defense. They do so not because of superior technology, but because they long ago made a definitive decision to build defenses.

This is what we have not yet done, and what we must do. Today under SDI, the United States is not building any weapons, or the component of any weapons, to destroy missiles. While prior to their incorporation into SDI a few U.S. programs were building anti-missile weapons or components, today all have been modified and are no longer doing so. SDI is researching technology that may or may not be available a decade or two or three hence. This involves "anti-missile beams," "artificial intelligence," and even mining the moon. It is investigating such impossible dreams as "birth to death battle management." That would mean keeping track of every object and bit of debris in a massive missile attack, keeping it identified through every phase, testing it with three separate space-based imaging techniques, coordinating action against it from a central computer, with the possibility of human override at every point.

Impossible dreams have come true too often for us to say they should not be pursued. But our responsibilities to the country lead us to demand that attention to the problems of the 21st century not make it impossible for us to solve those of the next five to fifteen years. *In short, common sense demands that research into the future not become an excuse for escapism from problems that may foreclose the future.*

It is clear to all who have worked with today's Pentagon that, except in highly compartmented, bureaucratically-unbound intelligence programs, it is too organizationally musclebound to develop anything new quickly. A new shroud for an Atlas space launcher takes more time to develop than did the Atlas missile originally. We cannot allow our need for strategic defense to be handled by anything but an organization that is wholly devoted to building them.

The technical tools are at hand. They are no more perfect in relation to the threat than likely they will ever be. But, unless someone can show very convincingly that the Soviet missile force will lost its frightening effectiveness in another way, there is no alternative to calling on the administration to break whatever bureaucratic barriers need to be broken and start cutting metal, *now*.

**Defense of Satellites**

Peace is threatened not just by the vulnerability of our missiles, but also by that of our satellites.

As the current controversy over the testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) suggests, our space-based assets

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are no longer invulnerable. In fact, the Soviets have already deployed a rocket-launched ASAT system that can attack our low-orbiting reconnaissance satellites and could improve it to attack satellites in higher orbits. In addition, the Soviets are developing ground-based lasers that might blind our lower-orbiting satellites. They have tested some of their high-powered radars in a way that would damage our satellites, and are the world's leaders in electronic jamming that can render satellites useless. Finally, with existing technology, the Soviets could develop and deploy space mines—explosive satellites that could be maneuvered or positioned near any of our satellites and could be commanded to explode without any warning in time of tension or war.

If enough of our key military satellites were destroyed simultaneously, the Soviets could prevent our execution of critical missions. Not only might our military be blinded to a possible strategic Soviet attack, but it might in lesser contingencies lose considerable control over and communications with our own conventional and nuclear forces. Finally, if space-based defenses against Soviet missiles are ever to be developed, their practicality will depend on the survivability of a variety of space-based assets, which Soviet ASATs might challenge.

Two kinds of efforts have been suggested to cope with this emerging Soviet threat. The first is simply to make our satellites less vulnerable by hardening them against lasers and weapons effects, by enabling them to maneuver and evade an attacker, by giving them the capability to shoot back if attacked, and by having enough satellites for each mission in space or on reserve so that if the Soviets do destroy some of our satellites, they will not be able to eliminate our ability to carry out critical missions.

This will help, but it is not likely to be sufficient. Nor would an arms control agreement banning further ASAT development or testing be helpful. First, verifying what is and what is not an ASAT and, therefore, compliance with an ASAT ban is virtually impossible. In fact, almost anything that enters space—ICBMs, SLBMs, satellites, space stations, space shuttles, ground-based lasers, and communication jammers—can be targeted to hit or degrade our satellites. These ASAT capabilities, the Soviets have noted, could be developed in the normal course of legitimate space activities.

Second, and more important, such a ban would prohibit the development and deployment of active satellite defenses (DSATs) critical to assure our satellites a modicum of survivability. And these defensive devices, which would be required to respond quickly against ASATs coming in from anywhere, would require overt testing much more than any offensive ASAT device. Thus, the ironic effect of an ASAT ban would be to *increase* uncertainty concerning the vulnerability of our satellites: It would be difficult to verify that the Soviets were not developing and deploying offensive ASATs and it would be virtually impossible to develop effective active satellite defenses against this threat.

Clearly, an ASAT ban is not good enough and is likely even to be harmful if we are serious about coping with the space vulnerability problem. What is needed is an agreement that would allow the United States to defend its satellites by keeping them and Soviet space assets far enough apart so as to make a surprise simultaneous attack against a significant number of U.S. satellites difficult in the extreme.

We could attempt to unilaterally enforce this separation of satellites in space, and indeed may conclude doing so. But this is one area where agreement is both possible and reliable, because each side would be responsible for enforcing the integrity of its own agreed-upon zone in space.

We could and should establish a number of "self-defense zones" for Western and Soviet satellites within which each side would have the right to inspect, expel or otherwise render harmless any invaders (should they exceed a safe number).

The size of these zones would have to vary for different satellites' orbits since some orbits are more densely populated than others. Geosynchronous orbit (22,000 miles above the Earth), where some of our most critical military satellites are, is the clearest and easiest case. It would be relatively easy to divide the circumference of this orbit, more than 170,000 miles, into a sizable number of large sectors—say thirty-six zones each, 4,600 miles across. Twelve zones each could be assigned to the United States and the Warsaw Pact, leaving twelve neutral zones.

Current and future satellites would enter the other side's zone at their peril if they exceeded a mutually agreed number. Satellites, if declared dead or uncontrollable, could be disposed of by the other side if they entered that side's zone. Enforcing the agreement by defending one's satellites would not, therefore, involve abrogating it (as with SALT). Indeed, self-defense would

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be a recognized principle in the agreed zones. Nothing, not even space self-defense zones, of course, is permanent or foolproof. With the development of very powerful space-based lasers, zones will become less meaningful, especially closer to Earth.

In addition to passive hardening and agreed self-defense zones, we should also consider the use of decoys and of other means for reducing the visibility of our valuable space assets to various kinds of Soviet sensors. Anti-satellite sensors can be easily confused for the very same reasons that warheads can be easily camouflaged and decoyed while travelling through space. The details must, of course, remain classified.

Although we strongly condemn the Soviet Union for violating its arms control agreements with the United States, fairness compels us to note that these violations, by themselves, are not responsible for the terrible and worsening fix in which we find ourselves. The Soviets simply pursued a strategic vision far different from our own by means that sometimes respected, sometimes twisted, and sometimes violated the agreements. The Soviet Union has sought, by all possible means, to build weapons to protect itself from American weapons whether on the ground, in the air, or in space. Our problem has been that we have refused to understand this, and have hoped that, in homage to pieces of paper they signed, the Soviets would somehow come to accept mutual vulnerability. This has not happened and simply will not happen. To say otherwise is so unrealistic as to be dishonest. Our problem has not been that the Soviets have behaved irrationally, but that we have refused to take advantage of the opportunities for self-protection, for reducing possible damage to ourselves and our assets that technology has provided us. By stubbornly hoping against hope for more than a decade that the Soviets would somehow agree to give up building the infrastructure for strategic defense, we have refused to do these things for ourselves. We have thereby created a huge imbalance that threatens the peace of the world.

We suggest a more realistic approach. Let us tell the Soviets that we are going to follow their example, and make whatever preparations we can for limiting damage to ourselves. Perhaps we can codify what we both are doing by some kind of agreement. But this does not matter so much as the fact that, by protecting ourselves, we will be removing from any Soviet leader a host of temptations to aggression that we have lately and thoughtlessly given him.



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